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This essay was originally presented at New Media and Global Transformations, a conference that took
place at Columbia University on October 9, 2009. It has been adapted for China Beat.
By Guobin Yang
An Uncanny Story[1]
On July 16, 2009, an anonymous internet user in a popular Baidu discussion forum posted a message
titled “Jia Junpeng, your mother wants you to go home to eat.” The message has only twelve Chinese
characters in its title and has no other content. Yet it got 3,000 responses within five hours, responses
that range from the routine socializing type (“Support!” “Interesting!”) to the funny and sarcastic (“I
am not going to eat at home today. I’m eating in the Internet bar. Please pass on my message to my
mom.”). Within one day, it received seven million hits and 300,000 comments. Large portal sites like
sina.com, netease.com, people.com and newspapers like Southern Metropolis began to cover it,
adding to its popularity. A cryptic posting was thus turned into a national media event. Jia Junpeng
became a household word in Chinese cyberspace overnight.
No one knows who posted the message or who the Jia Junpeng in the message is. In their responses,
many people doubted whether the Jia Junfeng in the posting refers to a real person. The name might
just have been made up by whoever posted the message.
As people were puzzling over this bizarre phenomenon, two new developments happened. First,
several business firms claimed that the Jia Junpeng event was the product of their online
marketing. The CEO of a new media firm, for example, alleged in early August that the entire event
had been created by his firm. He claimed that his firm had hired over 800 marketing personnel, who
then registered over 20,000 user IDs to post responses to that cryptic sentence, thus turning it into a
national media event. None of these firms has released evidence to prove their claim. It is possible
that their real marketing strategy is to try to get some share of the media limelight by making a
sensational claim. Even if these claims are unsubstantiated, however, they do suggest that it is
possible to manipulate or manufacture public sentiments in cyberspace.
The story does not end here. Just one day before the Jia Junpeng message appeared, a blogger by the
name of Guo Baofeng was detained by local police in the town of Mawei in Fujian province. Guo
Baofeng was accused of using his blog to spread rumors about local police. At the police station, he
secretly sent a text-message asking for urgent help: “I have been arrested by Mawei police. SOS.”
Upon receiving this message, his friends started campaigning for his release. Inspired by the Jia
Junpeng posting, one well-known blogger called on people to send postcards with the phrase “Guo
Baofeng, your mother wants you to go home to eat” to the police station where Guo was detained.
The address of the police station was posted online. This created a “postcard movement.” Some wellknown names in the Chinese blogosphere began sending postcards to Guo Baofeng through the post
office (whether they reached Guo is another matter). Similar messages were posted in online forums.
Although it is not clear how much this postcard movement might have helped, Guo Baofeng was soon
released.
It is mind-boggling that such an innocuous short sentence could generate so much interest and then
was appropriated in rather surprising ways. What does it tell us about new media and social
transformation in China?
I think the main message is that in China today, the internet can always be appropriated by users for
their own purposes, however closely it is monitored or controlled. Much more than the newspaper and
television, the internet depends on user participation. Bulletin boards, blogs, video web sites, social

networking sites all depend on users to contribute content if they are to survive. As long as this
feature does not change, internet users can always make creative or subversive use of it.
Why do people appropriate the Internet?
The Jia Junpeng case shows that there are both general and specific reasons that users appropriate
the Internet. At a general level, their appropriation of Internet forums and spaces is a reflection of
social sentiments. Chinese commentators point to the sense of alienation and isolation in
contemporary life. Many responses to the Jia Junpeng posting express feelings of boredom. One post
says, for example, “What I am posting is not a post. I am posting loneliness.” Other social sentiments,
such as nationalism, patriotism, and anger with corrupt officials have also electrified Chinese
cyberspace from time to time.
Specific reasons for appropriating the internet vary a great deal. In the Jia Junpeng case, Chinese
observers have remarked that it was at least partly an outpouring of frustration by members of that
particular online forum. The forum is set up for players of the popular game World of Warcraft. At that
time, the parent company of World of Warcraft, Blizzard Entertainment, had just selected netease.com
as its new China representative. In preparing to launch the game, however, netease.com had
encountered difficulties in obtaining a license. On June 30, 2009, Netease issued a public statement
apologizing to consumers for the delay in launching the game. This was frustrating to the members of
the forum. Thus, the Jia Junpeng posting became an occasion for expressing their frustration. This
would seem to suggest a kind of consumer activism – people appropriated the Jia Junpeng message to
express their dissatisfaction as consumers of a popular internet game.
Users also appropriate the Internet for political purposes. This is what happened when the Jia Junpeng
phrase was later used by Chinese bloggers to call for the release of activist-blogger Guo Baofeng. At
that point, an innocuous and cryptic phrase turned into a potent political slogan.
It is well known that the Internet is closely monitored and controlled in China. How can people use it
for subversive purposes?
The issue is not simply a matter of citizen expression versus state control, or freedom versus
repression, though these are of central importance. Even during more controlled periods such as the
Cultural Revolution, there were what Tang Tsou calls “zones of indifference” which state power did not
try to penetrate or control. In some ways, cyberspace is easier to control. A vast online community,
for example, may be monitored from a small central control office. Entire networks can be shut down.
Yet this does not mean Chinese cyberspace does not have its own “zones of indifference.” Gaming
communities, like the one where the Jia Junpeng case happened, are less of a concern for state
authorities than online forums on current affairs. In Chinese cyberspace there are also issues of
indifference to the state – everyday-life issues that do not touch on the state’s central nerve systems.
The Jia Junpeng posting is such an issue (if it is an issue at all). Yet as often happens in Chinese
politics, it is through these zones and issues of indifference that people begin to make difference.
There exists only a thin line between matters of indifference and difference.
Moving beyond the state-society framework, we will also need to look at the multiple dimensions of
the Internet – its economics, culture, society, as well as politics. The government is not the only
player in this game. There are other players as well, especially commerce and community. Internet
businesses have a vested interest in encouraging user participation. Online communities are an
essential component of all major commercial web sites, because they help to build a user base and
attract web traffic. Commercial and social forces thus provide favorable conditions for user
participation.
Why are some internet postings transformed into major media events, while numerous
others attract no attention at all?
Here the Jia Junpeng message poses the ultimate challenge. Does it make sense that such an
apparently pointless phrase should instantly go viral in Chinese cyperspace? On the internet in the US,
for example on YouTube, there are also postings or videos that occasionally go viral. Although analysts

have puzzled over such phenomena and business firms have picked up the concept of viral marketing,
no one knows yet why, when, and how a YouTube video or internet posting will go viral.
It seems to me that Internet postings become popular and are widely circulated for the same reasons
that folk sayings, folk songs, legendary tales, rumors, or even forbidden books have always been
circulated. These popular cultural forms often enjoy no official support. In fact, state authorities often
try to suppress them. And yet they have always managed to find their way into society and enjoy wide
if sometimes surreptitious circulation.
The reasons are more social than technological. After all, folk sayings and rumors, which are
traditionally among the fastest to spread, are low-tech cultural forms. They circulated by word of
mouth or relied on primitive media forms (such as hand-copied manuscripts during China’s Cultural
Revolution).
Most cases of popular Internet incidents in China, like the Jia Junpeng case, are fairly low-tech by the
standards of rapidly developing digital technologies. They happen mostly in online bulletin board
systems. People occasionally use cell phones to post messages in online forums. There are sometimes
postings of digital images. But most interaction consists of text-based BBS postings. BBS is a dated
form of network service in the US, but in China it is still a major platform for online interaction. Blogs
and social networking sites are catching up, but their influence still pales in comparison with BBS. The
main reason for the sustained popularity of BBS in China is history and culture. Generations of
Chinese Internet users, whether they are high school students, college students, or urban
professionals, started with BBS when they first went online. As a result, there has formed a rich and
dynamic culture of BBS that encourages participation. There is even a form of competitive
participation as people try to outdo one another in their jokes.
Another social factor that helps to explain why some postings go viral is the issue under discussion.
The Jia Junpeng case is exceptional in the sense that the original posting did not have a clear issue
(only the forum members knew they were angry with the delayed launch of their favorite game) and it
was in the middle of interaction that people attached issues to it. In less exceptional but equally
popular cases, the issues usually resonate with the public. They are often emotionally stirring. They
typically concern blatant violations of law and the norms of social morality, such as corruption or
violence inflicted on the poor and the vulnerable the rich and powerful. Cases like the death of Sun
Zhigang in 2003 or the abduction of teenagers into slave labor in 2007 immediately come to mind.
These and other similar cases pressured government authorities to take action after provoking public
uproar.
Finally, one must not underestimate the power of play in online interaction. Play is a social act, an
essential ingredient for community. Many responses to the Jia Junpeng message are sexual jokes,
jokes about family life, workplace relations, school life, and so on. People compete to see who is
funnier. Such playfulness is typical of Chinese Internet culture in general – recall how Chinese netizens
have recently played with the Grass-Mud Horse or the Green Dam Girl. There is evidently also
abundant play in the case of Jia Junpeng and the postcard movement.
Play is also a creative act. The social history of the Chinese Internet in the past ten years is a history
of play. Indeed, it is a history of growing playfulness. In content, design, and style, today’s web sites
in China are a world apart from those in the late 1990s. In the early 1990s, when Chinese students
overseas began to run Internet magazines, those magazines did not look very different from the print
magazines they had been familiar with. Today, it is hard to imagine how many different forms Internet
publications have morphed into. When personal homepages were in fashion in the late 1990s, people
were publishing their personal diary entries, a predecessor of today’s blogs. Yet even a cursory
comparison will show how much more playful today’s blogs are compared with the web diaries in the
“primitive” days of the Internet. And of course, for those who do not often go online, Chinese Internet
culture presents a different kind of challenge – there is a whole new language that netizens have
invented in the process of play, a language that makes little sense to those who do not partake in the
play. It wouldn’t be an exaggeration to say that the main features of Chinese Internet culture today
are the products of a history of play.

All this is to say that the seemingly curious case of Jia Junpeng is not so curious after all. A pointless
phrase does not go viral in cyberspace for no reason. I am not saying, though, that the circulation of
an Internet posting is the same as that of a rumor or folk saying in earlier times. The Internet differs
in one crucial aspect. It changes the speed and scale of communication. When large-scale
communication happens rapidly, the speed of social transformation quickens and the frequency of
transformative events increases dramatically. Consequently, it creates a more acute sense of
immediacy and urgency in our consciousness of current affairs.
This has both positive and negative consequences for political action and critical analysis. This sense
of urgency demands immediate action against violations of law, morality, and our sense of social
justice. It demands instant results. This is of vital importance. Yet I also wonder at times whether this
sense of urgency and immediacy, by fanning our desire for instant results, may not be guilty of
creating a sort of myopia. By focusing our attention on the possibilities and prospects of overnight
transformation, it makes us forget that the seeds of dramatic institutional transformation are often
planted in the small changes in everyday life. Such a myopic view little aids our efforts to gain a more
sophisticated and historical understanding of the complexities, multiple zones, and uncanniness of
Chinese Internet culture and politics.
Yang Guobin is an Associate Professor of Asian and Middle Eastern Cultures at Barnard
College. He is the author of the recently published book, The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen
Activism Online.

[1] Author’s note: For the use of the term “uncanny,” I am indebted to Lydia Liu, “The Freudian
Robot: The Figure of the Uncanny in New Media.” Talk at the conference on “New Media and Global
Transformation” on October 9, 2009, Columbia University.
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